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CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICAL MERGER ANALYSIS
Jonathan B. Baker*
Abstract: Merging parties and antitrust enforcers increasingly rely upon
econometric analyses to assess the competitive consequences of mergers in
differentiated product industries. Empirical studies promise to improve the
evaluation of mergers among sellers of branded consumer products,
particularly when point-of-sale scanner data on retail transactions is
available. This article addresses several technical issues in empirical
merger analysis, including the appropriate time interval for measuring
demand elasticities and aspects of the simulation methodology for
identifying mergers that give parties strong incentives to raise price.
INTRODUCTION
During the hearings on American industry concentration conducted by
the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) as the Great
Depression was ending, the United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel) in-
troduced empirical estimates of the demand function for steel.' This was
surely one of the first examples of the use of econometrics in a regulatory
proceeding.
Over the past five decades, the world of demand estimation has
changed as computational power has dramatically increased. U.S. Steel's
team of researchers2 estimated the parameters of five simple linear regres-
sion models, with up to four independent variables. Their major computa-
tional challenge was inverting a 5x5 matrix, presumably by hand. The tes-
timony does not indicate how long it took the company's team of statisti-
cians to compute these results and check their answers---perhaps days or
weeks. Today, a competent undergraduate using a regression package on
a personal computer could probably compute all the reported results in an
hour or two, with most of that time devoted to data entry. And the college
student's output would be much more sophisticated than what the statistical
" Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed are not neces-
sarily those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. The author is indebted
to Tim Bresnahan, Jerry Hausman, Dan Hosken, Dan O'Brien, Gary Roberts, Scott Thompson, Bob
Town, Mike Vita, and Mark Williams.
Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearings before the Temp. Nat'l Econ.
Comm. (Select Comm.), Iron and Steel Indus., 76th Cong. 13913 (1940) [hereinafter TNEC Hearings].
2 U.S. Steel commissioned multiple studies from a team of eight economists and graduate
students led by Dr. Theodore Yntema, a statistics professor at the University of Chicago's School of
Business. The steel demand study analysis was written by H. Gregg Lewis, who later became an
economics professor at Chicago and Duke.
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team provided in their report-merely the coefficients on the independent
variables and a goodness of fit measure. Today's computer program would
immediately provide standard errors on the coefficients, a plot of the
errors, and a host of other useful information that would have required a
significant recovery effort in the 1930's.
In addition, contemporary econometric methods are superior to those
readily available a half-century ago. The U.S. Steel report did not mention,
much less address, the "simultaneity" problem of identifying a demand
function from observations on price and quantity when demand and supply
are both shifting,3 though the statistical team was probably aware of the
issue." Today, the application of two stage least squares to address simul-
taneity in single equation models is textbook econometrics, and far better
tools are available in the rest of the econometrician's kit. Some
econometric methods of analyzing mergers in differentiated products
industries employed today, for example, estimate multiple equation demand
systems involving large numbers of products derived from more primitive
models of utility maximization, in contrast with the ad hoc single equation
models employed in US Steel's TNEC study of industry demand.5
Another change is on the way. With increasing computerization of
market transactions, the data available for researchers appears on the brink
of exploding, through disaggregation on multiple dimensions. First, U.S.
Steel worked with annual data, because monthly data was not available for
some of the key variables.6 Today, we are increasingly able to observe
prices and quantities sold on a weekly, daily, hourly, or even transaction-
by-transaction basis.7 Second, U.S. Steel studied the demand for a com-
posite steel aggregate, not broken down by grades, shapes or other features.
Today, in contrast, we can often observe transactions broken down into
. An "identification" or "simultaneity" problem in the estimation of demand functions arises
because prices and quantities change as a result of both shifts in demand and shifts in supply. The most
common technical solution relies on instrumental variables to effectively isolate in the data those situ-
ations where the supply curve is shifting along the demand function. This allows estimates of the elas-
ticity of demand not contaminated by the effects of movements of the demand curve.
See Carl Christ, Early Progress in Estimating Quantitative Economic Relationships in America,
75 AM. ECON. REV. 39 (1985) (special issue no. 6). At the TNEC Hearings, U.S. Steel's demand study
was criticized by a Department of Agriculture economist who argued that it underestimated the
(absolute value of the) demand elasticity. However, the underestimation was not because of the study's
failure to address simultaneity of supply and demand. TNEC Hearings, supra note 1, at 13724, 13729-
30 (testimony of Louis Bean) (highlighting the omission of the change in business activity as an inde-
pendent variable and the possible misleading influence of observations for 1923 and 1937).
For example, the demand systems referenced infra at notes 20-21 can be derived from as-
sumptions about preferences.
6 U.S. Steel's demand study employed yearly data for the 1920's and 1930's. Earlier data for
some of the key variables was unavailable, even on an annual basis, and monthly data was not
available for some of the time series. TNEC Hearings, supra note 1, at 13922.




more finely-parsed product categories, such as stock-keeping units (SKUs)
for products sold at retail. Consequently, we can hope to learn about the
basis for buyer choice not just between, say, Coke and Pepsi, but also
between regular, sugar-free, and caffeine-free variants, differing package
sizes and styles, and different distribution channels. A third form of data
explosion through disaggregation is on the horizon. Someday, we may be
able to match transactions data with information about the buyers, study
the determinants of consumption decisions for small groups of similarly
situated consumers (perhaps, for example, professional couples without
children living in the South) or even for individual consumers, and build
up demand functions from empirical estimates of disaggregated preferenc-
es.
A final difference between demand estimation today and a half-
century ago arises out of differences in the regulatory climate. In 1940,
U.S. Steel wanted to demonstrate that Depression-era steel demand was
inelastic, in order to suggest that steel industry unemployment was not the
result of high prices If U.S. Steel were merging with a horizontal rival
today, in contrast, it would likely hope that its econometric studies showed
that the demand for steel is highly elastic, because steel is sold in a broad
relevant product market that also includes aluminum, plastic, or other
demand substitutes. Were U.S. Steel proposing to merge with a horizontal
competitor, moreover, the company would also hope to demonstrate
empirically that within the product market, the products sold by non-
merging rival steel companies are close substitutes for the products that it
sells, while the products sold by its merger partner are not close sub-
stitutes.9 Such evidence would suggest that very little direct competition
would be lost by merger, and that the remaining competition would be
sufficient to protect consumers against anticompetitive conduct by the
merged firm.'
Over the past dozen years, developments in empirical industrial
organization economics, that help identify how closely the products of
merging firms function as substitutes for each other, have been altering
federal antitrust enforcement agencies' analysis of mergers among sellers
of branded consumer products." The opportunities to employ econometric
TNEC Hearings, supra note 1, at 13588 (testimony of Dr. Theodore Yntema).
Complaining customers or rivals, however, might seek to argue the reverse: that the demand
for steel is inelastic and U.S. Steel's products are close substitutes for those of their merger partner.
'0 The hypothetical facts would not support the theory of unilateral adverse competitive effects
of a merger among sellers of differentiated products set forth under section 2.21 of the 1992 Merger
Guidelines. U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,104 (1992) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
" Econometric tools can also be employed to identify and measure the existing market power of
brands and firms. Such methods are surveyed in Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical
Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST LJ. 3 (1992).
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methods to analyze mergers arise only occasionally-most often in mergers
among sellers of branded consumer products like beer, soft drinks, break-
fast cereals, or catfood, and not always then." But when such methods
are employed, the results are often influential in an enforcement agency's
evaluation of the proposed transaction.
13
I. WHAT CAN EMPIRICAL MERGER ANALYSIS TELL Us?
Empirical analyses of proposed mergers provide information about the
fine structure of demand. This information-particularly as it bears on
whether the products of the merging firms are close demand substitutes-
can be critical to the application of the localized competition theory of
unilateral competitive effects of mergers among sellers of differentiated
products set forth in section 2.21 of the Merger Guidelines.'4 Accordingly,
econometric estimates of demand elasticities, when available, are typically
much more informative than market shares in helping make inferences
about whether such mergers will likely enhance market power."
Econometric studies of market power in the U.S. brewing industry,
during the 1970's, highlight the value of going beyond market shares to
understand the competitive roles of individual firms and brands. 6
Anheuser-Busch, the producer of Budweiser, was the market share leader
but exercised little market power after 1975. Moreover, market shares did
not strongly distinguish Pabst and Coors. These two firms had similar
shares of national beer sales, and each had a high share in a distinct region
of the country. Yet the two firms played distinct competitive roles: Coors
The anticompetitive story under investigation is typically the unilateral competitive effects
theory for mergers among sellers of differentiated products set forth in section 2.21 of the Merger
Guidelines. Studies may be conducted by economic experts working for the merging firms or
complaining rivals, as well as by enforcement agency economists.
13 Unless the private parties share their data and help agency economists replicate their estimates,
however, the agency can neither assess the sensitivity of conclusions to modeling decisions made by
the parties (such as specification of functional form, assumptions about error structure, or choice of in-
strumental variables) nor limit party incentives to emphasize those results most suggestive of their
desired outcome.
'" Enforcement agency economists today most commonly employ unilateral theories of harmful
competitive effect, including this theory, though mergers may also harm competition by making
coordination more likely or more effective. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive
Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 11 ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 21.
"5 Merger analysis is prospective under the Merger Guidelines, typically grandfathering existing
market power, and focusing on whether the merger makes matters worse. If existing market power is
obtained through anticompetitive means, those means can be challenged independently under the anti-
trust laws.
16 See Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve
Facing a Single Firm, 6 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988); Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan,




faced few close competitors while Pabst faced many. Had Anheuser-Busch
acquired either Pabst or Coors, it would have had little incentive to raise
either Pabst's or Coors' prices' 7-but for divergent reasons reflecting the
two firms' differing competitive roles. Budweiser did not provide much
constraint on Coors' pricing because Coors was isolated in product space.
In contrast, so many brands constrained Pabst's pricing that the loss of one
such competitor gave Pabst little additional pricing power.
Part of the promise of using empirical methods in merger analysis is
that they make market definition less important. Indeed, if a merger can be
shown to harm competition directly, antitrust should not need to spend
much effort on market defmition-a great benefit when the array of
products are broad and seamless, making market definition difficult. Yet,
many read the language of Clayton Act Section 7 as requiring a court to
identify the product and geographic market within which competition
would be harmed by an acquisition. 8 One plausible doctrinal adapta-
tion-harmonizing the strengths of econometric analyses with the statutory
requirement -might be termed a "res ipsa loquitur" market definition.
When a piano crashes to the sidewalk, tort law does not ask whether
someone is negligent; it goes right to the question of who is negligent.
Similarly, if the likely harm to competition from a merger can be demon-
strated directly, there exists a market where harm will occur, but there is
little need to specify the market's precise boundaries. 9
II. SOME TECHmCAL ISSUES IN EMPIICAL MERGER ANALYSIS
The remainder of this article highlights some technical issues that
arise in the application of econometric techniques for the analysis of
mergers among sellers of differentiated products. These issues are raised in
implementing current popular approaches for econometric merger analysis
'7 Either acquisition would have given Anheuser-Busch a strong incentive to raise the price of
Budweiser, however. Coors and Pabst each provided some competitive constraint on Budweiser's
pricing. Cf infra note 39 (plausibility of asymmetric demand cross elasticities between Coors and
Budweiser).
" 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994) (prohibiting acquisitions likely to lessen competition substantially or
tend to create a monopoly "in any line of commerce or ... section of the country").
,9 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some
Antitrust Policy Issues, 42 ANTrrRUST BULL. (forthcoming Spring 1997). Market definition is
unnecessary in Sherman Act rule of reason cases if harm is shown directly. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986). Market definition is needed to apply existing Merger
Guidelines' safe harbors based on concentration, however. Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, §1.51.
Moreover, estimates of demand elasticities may be biased if some close substitutes are excluded from
the econometric analysis. For this reason, market definition can be useful even when market shares
provide little information about harm to competition. Baker, supra note 14, at 25.
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-the "almost ideal" demand system;' the logit model;2' and partial
residual demand functions.22 They would also be raised to estimate other
familiar demand models (from single equation linear or double-log models
to multi-equation translog systems) that relate output directly to prices,'
or to estimate models that characterize the distribution of consumer prefer-
ences across product characteristics."'
The focus on technical issues is not intended to suggest skepticism
about the value of econometric evidence in merger reviews. Indeed, these
evolving approaches to merger analysis have the potential to become the
dominant methodology for analyzing mergers among firms selling branded
consumer products, particularly when employed in conjunction with cor-
roborating information from marketing documents and industry experts.
A. The Appropriate Time Interval for Measuring Demand Elasticities
When scanner data is available, it may provide observations separated
by a shorter time period than the monthly, quarterly, or annual data
routinely employed in the past. A higher frequency of sampling increases
the number of observations available over a given period. Data collected
over three years, for example, can offer only three yearly observations or
twelve quarterly observations on the variables-surely too few to permit
statistical analysis. But three years provides thirty-six monthly observations
'" AIDS models, developed by Deaton & Muellbauer, evolved out of an empirical effort to test
the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions placed on demand by economic theory. ANGUS DEATON &
JOHN MUELLBAUER, ECONOMICS AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 75-78 (1980); Angus Deaton & John
Muellbauer, An Almost Ideal Demand System, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 312 (1980). To do so, it is
necessary to estimate simultaneously a demand function for every commodity. Researchers doing so
typically defined the "goods" as broad aggregates like food, clothing or fuel. Hausman, Leonard &
Zona first applied the AIDS system to merger analysis, reinterpreting the goods as individual brands.
Jerry Hausman et al., Competitive Analysis with Differentiated Products, 34 ANNALES D'ECON. STAT.
159 (1994). See also Jerry Hausman & Gregory Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products
Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
2 Gregory Werden & Luke Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries:
Logit Demand and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 407 (1994); Gregory Werden et al., The Use
of the Logit Model in Applied Industrial Organization, 3 INT'L J. ECON. BuS. 83 (1996).
" See Baker & Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product Differentiated Indus-
tries, supra note 16.
' For a survey of some functional forms employed in demand system estimation, see ROBERT A.
POLLAK & TERENCE J. WALES, DEMAND SYSTEM SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION (1992).
" See generally Steven Berry & Ariel Pakes, Some Applications and Limitations of Recent
Advances in Empirical Industrial Organization: Merger Analysis, 93 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proc.)
247 (1993); Steven Berry, Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation, 25 RAND
J. EON. 242 (1994); Steven Berry et al., Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium, 63 ECONOMETRICA
841 (1995); TIMOTHY BRESNAHAN ET AL., MARKET SEGMENTATION AND THE SOURCES OF RENTS
FROM INNOVATION: PERSONAL COMPUTERS IN THE LATE 1980's (National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 5726, 1996).
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or one hundred fifty-six weekly observations. Frequent sampling raises the
issue of the appropriate time interval for measuring the demand elasticities
relevant to assessing the competitive effects of acquisitions.
The appropriate time interval for measuring elasticities is an economic
question distinct from the statistical issue of the frequency of sampling. It
is easy to slip into allowing the latter to dictate the former, however. In
particular, the availability of weekly data may permit estimates of very
short-run demand functions that the seller faces from week to week. Yet
under some circumstances, very short-run demand elasticities may mislead
when employed to analyze the competitive effects of merger.
The potential problem with using weekly demand functions to analyze
the likely effects of mergers arises from short-term price promotions by
sellers of consumer products, combined with short-term inventories held by
consumers. Manufacturers and retailers of branded consumer products
commonly offer short term promotions many times of year, allowing
consumers, able to hold inventories, to stock up during deal weeks.
Promotions can occur as frequently as every other week on average, and
the price during deal weeks is often discounted more than 25% from the
regular price." The estimated own and cross-price elasticities of weekly
demand could readily be dominated by the consumer response to short-
term price promotions.
These very short-run elasticities may have value as guides to sellers
making decisions about whether to alter the spread between regular and
promotional prices, but they may not always help answer the competitive
effects question posed by a merger. When seller promotions and consumer
inventorying are important, the relevant demand elasticity for merger
analysis should answer an intermediate-run question such as the following:
if both the regular and the promotional price were to rise by a small
amount, holding constant the frequency and relative size of typical promo-
tions, how does average quantity sold change? This is an appropriate
demand elasticity, because merging rivals selling branded consumer prod-
ucts might reasonably be expected to exercise market power by raising the
average price level, while continuing to offer regular sales.26
Although it is difficult to assess a priori the direction and magnitude
of the difference between weekly demand elasticities and intermediate-run
elasticities,27 under some circumstances, the monthly or quarterly demand
' See, e.g., Aradhna Krishna et al., Consumer Perceptions of Promotional Activity, 55 J.
MARKETING 4, 9, 11 (1991).
Although the merged firm might instead choose to exercise market power by reducing the
frequency or extent of promotions, these alternative strategies are unlikely to be profitable unless the
strategy described in the text is also profitable.
' The relation between the two is complex: the frequency of deals, the discount off the regular
price, and buyer inventory behavior are jointly determined, related to consumer behavior in both the
1997]
GEo. MASON L. REv.
functions likely more relevant to merger analysis could tend to have
smaller own elasticities and larger cross elasticities than weekly demand
functions for the same products. Suppose, for example, that on average,
consumer inventories for a product would last two weeks. This would
permit a consumer who thinks a price increase is temporary to delay a
week-wait for a sale or other promotion (e.g. coupon)-rather than pay
the higher price or switch to a less-preferred brand sold by a competitor.
But once inventories are drawn down, the consumer may conclude that the
price increase is permanent, and either pay it or switch to a less-preferred
brand sold by a rival. If so, weekly demand may have larger (in absolute
value) demand own elasticities and smaller demand cross elasticities than
quarterly demand.' As a result, a firm may find that an acquisition of a
rival brand may make it profitable to raise price on its current brands
substantially, even if very short-run demand elasticities appear to suggest
otherwise.
This problem could be minimized by keying the frequency of sam-
pling to the length of a complete promotion and inventory cycle. If
promotions typically occur one week a month, and surveys reveal that
average consumer inventories are two weeks, for example, demand
functions estimated on monthly data might adequately represent intermedi-
ate term consumer responses. If instead, price promotions are not important
or consumer inventories are small, elasticities estimated on weekly data
may not mislead when applied to merger analysis. This solution is not
perfect, however. Aggregation over time ignores information available
from frequent sampling, and may introduce biases of its own.29
A better approach would recover an intermediate-run demand elastici-
ty with weekly sampling through explicit modeling of short-run promotions
and household inventories. Such an approach would effectively separate
out the effects of short-term promotions and consumer inventorying on
very short term and the intermediate run.
The FTC's economic staff recently identified the hypothesized effect on estimated cross elastic-
ities when analyzing scanner data in connection with the recent review of a merger involving branded
consumer products. That is, brand quantity did not appear to respond to variation in the price of
demand substitutes as much when weekly data was used, as it appeared to respond in monthly data.
The movements in cross-elasticity point estimates were often economically substantial. For example,
cross elasticities estimated in the 0.1 to 0.3 range when weekly data was used were estimated in the 0.3
to 0.6 range using the same model on monthly data. Shifting from weekly to monthly data did not
make as much difference to the own elasticities, in contrast. The movement in cross elasticities was
large enough potentially to make a noticeable difference in the inferred incentive to raise price post-
merger.
'9 Cf ERNsT BERNDT, THE PRACnCE OF ECONOMETRCS: CLASsIc AND CoTEMPORARY 389-93
(1991) (surveying studies of the biases associated with temporal aggregation in analyses of the effect
of advertising on sales of branded consumer products). On the other hand, price variation in
disaggregated data may reflect data sampling problems (such as variation across buyers in the size of
the purchased product) that would be smoothed in aggregated data.
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demand elasticities by looking for differences in the consumer response to
transitory price changes from the response to persistent price changes?
But it may be difficult to model short-term promotions and inventorying,
because firms may employ promotions for more than one reason: as a way
of discriminating in price between two groups of buyers who differ in
short-run demand elasticity,3' or in an effort to induce buyers to shift
from other products.
Pending progress in this modeling task, a robustness test may provide
evidence about the magnitude of the potential problem with weekly
demand elasticities in markets where short-term promotions and consumer
inventorying appear to be important. In particular, if demand elasticities
estimated on weekly data do not change substantially when the model is
reestimated using monthly or quarterly sample periods, it is unlikely that
the weekly elasticities will mislead when used in merger analysis.32
This approach also promises to help clarify the time series structure of the errors, and make
clear how best to account for autocorrelation of the disturbances in estimating the demand functions.
Autocorrelation may arise if the demand shocks resulting from promotions or advertising are not inde-
pendent over time. For example, buyer demand may respond to promotions over a number of weeks
(perhaps with unusually high demand during promotional periods and unusually low demand when
inventory levels are high), and respond to brand advertising over a number of months (presumably with
the greatest response during and shortly after the ad campaign). Autocorrelation of the errors may bias
statistical significance tests of elasticity estimates.
", Customers with unpredictable demand and high costs of storing inventories might have inelastic
short-run demand, for example.
32 A second advantage of estimating the model on monthly or quarterly, rather than weekly data,
is that it may be easier to identify a demand function in a simultaneous equation system in monthly or
quarterly data, for two reasons. First, it may be possible to collect monthly or quarterly data on many
exogenous cost-shift variables, the most common instruments for identifying demand when the brand
price is endogenous, even if weekly data on those variables are unavailable. Second, an alternative
approach to identification, the methodology employed by Hausman, Leonard & Zona, rests upon an
assumption that, for many industries, may be more plausible when data is sampled at longer intervals.
Hausman et al., supra note 20, at 165. See Jerry Hausman & William Taylor, Panel Data and
Unobservable Individual Effects, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1377, 1386 (198 1). In particular, Hausman, Leon-
ard & Zona assume that the nationwide component of individual city prices (in a data set including
multiple cities) reflects variation in the manufacturer's production and distribution costs, rather than
demand shifts not controlled for in the estimated demand function. If so, the nationwide component of
prices will be an appropriate instrument for identifying city demand because it will be correlated with
a city's price, but not correlated with the component of the city's price related to unobservable demand
shocks. For many industries, this assumption may be more plausible when monthly or quarterly data
is employed than when weekly data is used. Demand for branded consumer products may be more
stable over months rather than weeks (after controlling for predictable seasonal shifts and observable
variation in the level of brand advertising), to the extent aggregation over time smooths the short-term
effects of price promotions that simultaneously take place in multiple cities (e.g. promotions at all loca-
tions of a regional or national retailer). In contrast, the price of key inputs into production, marketing,
and distribution may be more likely to vary substantially month-to-month than week-to-week, and thus
tend to dominate the nationwide component of individual city prices in monthly or quarterly data.
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B. What Do the Elasticities Mean? Issues in the Use of Simulations
With full knowledge of the demand system (own and cross elastici-
ties), the nature of oligopoly behavior (including the behavior of prospec-
tive entrants), and costs for all firms in an industry; with knowledge of
these functions not just locally but in a significant range; and with knowl-
edge of how costs and behavior would change with a proposed merger;
merger analysis would become merely a matter of computation. This
information would permit the direct calculation of the post-merger
equilibrium, and thus a determination of how prices would change.
In practice, such computations cannot be performed; the information
demands are simply too great. But it is possible, and increasingly common,
to simulate mergers by combining estimates about some of the necessary
information with assumptions about the rest. Simulations synthesize a great
deal of empirical information in a logically consistent way to help identify
mergers that give the parties strong incentives to raise price.33 They also
provide a means of determining the sensitivity of such conclusions to
uncertainty about the estimates and disagreements about the plausibility of
the assumpions.' Because the simulation procedure necessarily combines
estimates and assumptions about which there may be significant uncertain-
ty, the output of the procedure-a set of projected price changes-is better
viewed as an indicator of the strength of incentives, rather than as a fore-
cast.3
Four issues about appropriate simulation methodology will be high-
lighted below. First, the value of simulations that make assumptions about
demand elasticities, rather than incorporating empirical evidence,' de-
3 See generally Gregory Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products Mergers: A
Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 363 (1997). The simulation
approach that has to date been the most developed is that suggested by Werden and Froeb. Gregory
Werden & Luke Froeb, Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated
Product Industries, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTrrRUST PRoCESS 65 (Malcolm Coate & Andrew
Kleit eds., 1996). Hausman & Leonard propose an alternative method of simulating post-merger prices
from information on premerger prices and estimated demand elasticities. Hausman and Leonard, supra
note 20.
' Moreover, simulations can be valuable for educating intuitions. Even when it is difficult to ven-
ture a good estimate of every element that goes into computing likely post-merger price changes,
experimentation with the simulation model can help identify the critical parameters on which the
magnitude of anticompetitive incentives depends, and thus guide the collection and analysis of qualita-
tive evidence on the most critical issues.
"s Another indicator of incentives to raise price can be derived from the estimation of partial
residual demand functions. See Baker & Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product
Differentiated Industries, supra note 16.
' Econometric estimates of demand elasticities are not based purely on empirical evidence. The
specification of the econometric model invariably also incorporates assumptions justified by experience,
insight derived from economic theory, or mathematical tractability. Empirical estimates are nevertheless
data-driven, while assumptions about demand elasticities are not.
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pends on the strength of the qualitative evidence used to justify those
assumptions. In particular, some benchmarking methodologies for analyz-
ing mergers rely on assumptions about the degree of substitution among
products-most commonly, that all products in the market are equally
good substitutes. a7 Evidence to support such an assumption is required
because the cross elasticities among products within a market can have any
relationship: there is no basis, theoretical3" or empirical,39 for presuming
absent evidence from the market at issue that the cross elasticities are
symmetric or related to market share, for example. Accordingly, in order
for simulations based upon assumptions about elasticities to aid merger
analysis, the assumptions should be suggested by non-statistical evidence,
as from marketing documents.4
Second, the value of simulation results that employ accounting
estimates of average variable cost as a proxy for marginal cost depends on
the quality of the proxy. Marginal cost estimates are relevant in simulating
the effect of mergers because profit-maximizing firms determine price as
a markup over marginal cost.41 With information on pre-merger marginal
"' For examples of benchmark methodologies based entirely or largely on assumptions about
demand elasticities (or closely related concepts like diversion ratios), see Merger Guidelines, supra note
10, § 2.211; Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 ANTTRUST 23 (Spring 1996);
Luke Froeb & Gregory Werden, Simulating the Effects of Mergers Among Noncooperative Oligopolists,
in COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE. MODELING AND ANALYSIS WrrH MATHEMATiCA 177
(Hal Varian ed., 1996) (imposing symmetric substitution among the products within a nest); R. Preston
McAfee et al., Horizontal Mergers in Spatially Differentiated Noncooperative Markets, 40 J. INDus.
ECON. 349 (1992).
' Demand theory does constrain the relationship among own and cross elasticities for all products
in the economy, but that economy-wide aggregation constraint provides no practical limitation on the
elasticities within a product market. See, e.g., JAMES HENDERSON & RICHARD QUANDT, MICROECO-
NOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 33 (3d ed. 1980). It may be convenient to impose
additional constraints in order to develop mathematically tractable demand systems, but such additional
assumptions are not mandated by economic theory.
" The plausibility of asymmetric cross elasticities is suggested by an interpretation of the relative
competitive roles of Budweiser and Coors during the 1970's. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying
text. Most of those customers who considered Budweiser and Coors to be their first and second
choices, and were close to indifferent between the two brands, appear to have selected Budweiser at the
then-current prices. Hence a Budweiser price rise would have induced marked substitution to Coors,
while a Coors price rise would not have induced much substitution to Budweiser. Had the price of
Coors been lower, the likely brand switchers might have largely selected that brand instead. Under such
circumstances, Coors demand would have exhibited a significant cross elasticity with Budweiser, and
the cross elasticity of Budweiser with Coors would not have been as great.
' In some cases, it may not be possible to obtain good empirical evidence on demand elasticities,
either because data is unavailable or the available data is not informative (e.g. because prices of the
substitutes are collinear). Under such circumstances, it may be necessary to rely on non-statistical evi-
dence exclusively.
4" A profit-maximizing firm selling a single product sets price or output by equating the Lemer
Index of markup over marginal cost (price less marginal cost, as a fraction of price) with the inverse
of the elasticity of the residual demand function it perceives itself as facing. (Equivalently, and more
familiarly, the firm selects output by equating marginal revenue with marginal cost). The residual
demand elasticity is in turn a function of own- and cross-elasticities of demand, as well as parameters
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cost, the pre-merger markup of price over marginal cost can be computed.
In combination with demand elasticity estimates, this markup information
can be used to make an inference about the nature of the pre-merger
oligopoly interaction (the intensity of pre-merger competition). 2 Errors in
estimating marginal cost can lead to mistaken inferences about the magni-
tude of pre-merger markups and the intensity of pre-merger competition.
For example, if a firm's marginal cost at its pre-merger output is underesti-
mated, its inferred price-cost margin will be biased upward and its pre-
merger conduct will appear less competitive than it actually is. A poor pic-
ture of the pre-merger interaction can lead to a misleading conclusion
about the incentives to raise price post-merer.43
Accounting measures of average variable cost that exclude all expen-
ditures on advertising and other promotion may underestimate marginal
cost," and thus lead simulations to suggest a misleading conclusion about
the incentives to raise price post-merger. The marginal cost relevant to
pricing includes those advertising and promotional expenditures that would
change were the firm to adopt a different pricing strategy over a full
promotion and inventory cycle. '5 Hence, an estimator of marginal cost
that excludes all promotional expenditures on the ground that they are pre-
determined in the very short run may systematically understate the incre-
mental cost related to the intermediate-term pricing decision most relevant
to merger analysis.
Even if some promotional expenditures are included in a measure of
reflecting oligopoly behavior. See generally Baker & Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand
Curve Facing a Single Firm, supra note 16.
' Alternatively, that inference may be used to confirm the plausibility of an assumption about the
oligopoly solution concept.
3 For example, a marginal cost underestimate (markup overestimate) limited to one of the
merging firms may lead to an overstatement of the competitive danger from merger. Suppose firms A
and B merge, the marginal cost of all industry firms except firm B is estimated without error, and firm
B's marginal costs are underestimated. Although the merged firm may have only a limited incentive
to raise the price on firm A's products, that incentive may be overstated because it may appear as
though A would profit greatly by internalizing the benefit of diversion to the products of firm B.
If marginal cost is underestimated across-the-board (for all firms), and in consequence all
markups are overestimated, the simulations will likely also misstate the incentive to raise price post-
merger. The forces at work go in opposite directions. On the one hand, it may mistakenly appear as
though the industry participants have previously obtained much of the potential gains from the exercise
of market power, suggesting that the simulations would understate the competitive danger. On the other
hand, it may mistakenly appear that the remaining firms will respond passively to the loss of
competition between the merging firms, and not expand output aggressively, thus overstating the
incentive of the merged firm to raise price.
" Estimators of marginal cost that infer cost from market share by making an assumption about
the nature of premerger oligopoly behavior (e.g. presuming that firms with high market shares sell
more because they have low cost) raise similar problems.
, The stock of reputational capital arising from brand advertising often has a half-life measured
in months. See BERNDT, supra note 29, at 392. This observation suggests that a great deal of brand
advertising expenditures affects pricing rapidly.
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average variable cost, that measure may understate the incremental cost of
expanding output in branded consumer product industries because of the
nature of product differentiation. The characteristics of any individual
differentiated product-including styles, features, manufacturer reputation
for quality and service, etc.-typically appeal more to some customers than
others. Firms selling such products may therefore experience decreasing
returns to scale in promotion and distribution, and face upward sloping
supply functions, even if they experience constant returns to scale in pro-
duction. The extra expenditure the firm must make to induce a purchase by
an additional buyer, either by increasing advertising or otherwise varying
product characteristics, represents an element of marginal cost that may not
be reflected in average variable cost data.
Non-quantitative evidence may be brought to bear to determine
whether average variable costs adequately capture the incremental costs
relevant to pricing. In particular, industry marketing documents might be
reviewed and industry participants queried to identify the costs on which
firm pricing decisions are based. This information may suggest how well
accounting measures of average variable cost incorporate the costs relevant
to antitrust merger analysis.4
The third issue about appropriate simulation methodology is the
usefulness of evidence about the way the firms interact (the oligopoly
solution concept) pre-merger. Some simulation approaches, for example,
presume Bertrand-Nash behavior, this is often the most convenient assump-
tion for mathematical tractability. Yet economic theory does not dictate the
choice of solution concept. Even if firms understand what they are doing
as setting price rather than outputs, for example, as may be common
among sellers of branded consumer products, and thus act consistently with
one theoretical predicate for Bertrand-Nash competition, their behavior may
be more consistent with Cournot-Nash conduct 7 or some other oligopoly
solution concept.
Empirical methodologies for estimating the solution concept are well
developed." When estimation is not practical or successful, however, it
, Marginal cost is difficult to estimate. Indeed, the new empirical industrial organization literature
treats marginal cost as unobservable, and infers the price-cost margin from the response of firms to a
variety of exogenous shocks, rather than computing the margin directly from price and cost data. Tim-
othy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 1011, 1012 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). On the other hand,
the merging parties and antitrust enforcers (through compulsory process) have access to information on
the determinants of firm pricing and output decisions, from which to evaluate accounting proxies for
marginal cost, that are typically unavailable to academic researchers.
' David M. Kreps & Jos6 A. Scheinkman, Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition
Yield Cournot Outcomes, 14 BELL J. ECON. 326 (1983).
' Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified, 10 ECON. LErrERs 87
(1982). See generally Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 11, at 9-13.
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may be useful to test the robustness of simulation results that assume
Bertrand competition to alternative solution concepts-for example, to
some other solution concept such as Cournot-Nash equilibrium that
presumes that products are strategic substitutes rather than strategic
complements (as the Bertrand assumptions presume).'9
Finally, simulation results may be sensitive to assumptions about the
out-of-sample behavior of demand functions. Mergers create large changes
in market structure, and thus may generate discrete, not localized, move-
ments in output and prices. As a result, a merger may move the industry
partial equilibrium to a position on the demand curve not observed in the
historical data. Changes in the assumed curvature of the demand function
as the industry equilibrium moves to out-of-sample prices and outputs-
more precisely, the elasticity of the demand elasticity--can be very
influential in determining the price changes that result from merger.' If
industry demand grows highly inelastic when industry output falls slightly,
an anticompetitive merger may lead to a large increase in price. Converse-
ly, if industry demand grows highly elastic when output rises slightly,
firms have a great incentive to pass through variable cost reductions from
merger, and an acquisition may actually lower price by more than the
reduction in marginal cost.5 In evaluating the conclusions of simulation
modeling, it should be helpful to determine whether the results are sensi-
tive to reasonable variation in the assumed out-of-sample behavior of de-
mand.
CONCLUSION
Empirical merger analysis mixes estimation and simulation, and both
tasks are conducted using simplifying assumptions. 2 Differences in those
assumptions can lead to divergent inferences about the incentives to raise
price following merger. In one recent transaction considered by the FTC,
for example, one outside economist concluded that the price of a leading
brand sold by a merging firm would rise only 2%. Another outside
economist, working for a different party, concluded that the same price
4' Simulation results will be affected if the solution concept is Cournot but is mistakenly assumed
to be Bertrand much as they would if marginal cost were overestimated across-the-board. See supra
note 43.
" This problem arises regardless of the demand system used in inferring incentives to change
price following merger.
s' As a rule of thumb, a monopolist facing a linear demand function (or an oligopolist perceiving
that it faces a linear residual demand function) and constant marginal cost, will pass through half of
any marginal cost decline through to buyers as lower prices. Demand must become more elastic as
price falls for the firm to pass through more than the marginal cost reduction.
52 See supra note 37.
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would rise 14%. A third outside economist, working for a third interested
party, found that the price would rise by 27%.
This story should not be taken to suggest that the demand estimation
and merger simulation tools are not helpful in merger analysis. Our review
of these studies permitted us to identify the critical assumptions leading to
the differing results, thus enabling us to determine what assumptions were
most consistent with the qualitative evidence uncovered in the investigation
and to identify the most credible inferences about the strength of incentives
to raise price. This example highlights the importance of testing the
sensitivity of parameter estimates and simulation results to critical assump-
tions, by reworking the models with alternative assumptions over a
reasonable range.53 It also points out what is perhaps the most important
way these new tools can improve merger analysis: they help identify the
most critical assumptions and, in so doing, guide a search for additional
evidence that will improve decision-making.
"3 When statistical specification tests are employed in lieu of robustness analysis to show that a
critical assumption is not rejected in the data, it is important to understand the power of those
specification tests. This may involve identifying the range of alternative assumptions that would also
not have been rejected in the data.
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